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THESIS

BURDEN SHARING

THE CASE OF

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ANDREW RUSSELL McMAHON

1988

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BURDEN SHARING: THE CASE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

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A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fullfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
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ABSTRACT

Sharing the cost of the NATO alliance is a popular argument often raised in America. There are many Americans who compare their country's defense spending with the spending of the various European allies and thus conclude that there is an inequitable sharing of these costs. This thesis examines this argument, known as burden sharing, as it relates to West Germany. Besides considering solely NATO defense spending, which is defined by a narrow set of conditions, this thesis will look at all the contributions that West Germany makes which strengthen the alliance in Western Europe.

Research reveals that after taking into account America's other global commitments, both America and West Germany have spent the same amount of their Gross Domestic Product on NATO over the last reported thirteen year period. In addition to this spending, West Germany has contributed land for bases for the seven different nations that supply soldiers to NATO, and has provided support for these soldiers that enhance their war fighting capability. Maintaining the cost of West Berlin's military forces is also a cost that West Germany bears alone without credit for NATO defense spending. When these various facts are considered, charges of inequitable sharing of costs of the alliance are not a valid criticism to be leveled at West Germany.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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[REDACTED] He is the youngest son of Edward and Ruth McMahon. He lived for eighteen years in San Leandro, California, whereupon after his graduation from San Leandro High School in 1976, he was admitted to the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. Upon his graduation in 1980, he received a Bachelor of Science Degree and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army. He has been married to the former Linda Mueller since 1980, and is the father of a son, Edward. He is currently a Captain in the 76th Field Artillery Regiment, and served five years in West Germany with that Regiment before beginning his present assignment. Since April 1986 he has been undergoing training as a Foreign Area Officer, graduating with honors from the German Language Course of the Defense Language Institute at Monterey, California in December 1986 and arriving at Cornell University in January 1987 to pursue a course of instruction in Western European Studies. Upon graduation he will serve as a German Language Instructor at West Point.

For My Mentor

Erwin Krahner

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Any person familiar with the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will know that there has never been complete harmony among the members. There has always been some controversy over some facet of NATO policy. Technology, strategy, membership roles, nuclear weapons, commitment, leadership, and burden sharing are some of the most prominent sources of contention that have occurred over the years. The 1980's seem to have been a particularly difficult time for the Atlantic alliance. As the debate and protest died down in Europe over the stationing of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the issue of burden sharing once again arose in America with an intensity not felt before. It has caused fears among the Europeans that America might reduce its commitment to the alliance.

Controversy within the alliance is only natural. The membership is comprised of sixteen sovereign nations, each of whom is a sovereign state with a different degree of local and international power in relation to the others, and a different set of national goals and priorities. The fact that defense is a common goal makes the continuation of NATO possible. It is because of these different goals

and priorities that America's allies are especially concerned over the burden sharing debate. America's business is business, and business has been bad lately. Rising budget and trade deficits have put America in the uncomfortable position of being a debtor nation. The fact that America seems to be subsidizing the defense of the same European nations that it competes with in trade adds fuel to the controversy. The call has once again been raised that it is time that the Europeans do more for their own defense. The purpose of this study is to examine this issue as it relates to West Germany.

My definition of burden sharing is straight forward and simple, and it is at odds with the official definition. I consider it to be the manner in which each of the members of the alliance share the burdens of common defense. The official definition considers defense spending to be a country's contribution to NATO, and does not consider other contributions that occur outside of this spending as relevant. I will show that the official definition does not take into account all the facts that need to be considered when speaking of contributions to the alliance. Some of these contributions do not visibly cost West Germany money. Others do but are not considered defense spending. But these contributions are important for the support they give the alliance, and are done as a result of West Germany's participation in NATO.

In order to limit the scope of this study, I will only look at contributions as they affect the alliance within the area which defines NATO. This is necessary in order to avoid having to take into consideration the various foreign policies of West Germany and America and trying to determine their affect on world harmony and thus peace in Europe.

Limiting the scope in this manner also means that only the part of America's defense spending that affects NATO will be considered. I feel that this is valid since America spends its money on defense to protect its own interests abroad. The fact that these interests sometimes coincide with our European allies should not cause total defense spending to be considered a part of the NATO contribution. America has the same interest in protecting Europe as do the Europeans. It is often said that the Europeans need to do more for their defense because it is their last line of defense against attack. By the same token, Europe is America's first line of defense against attack, and our involvement means that a conventional war will be confined to that continent. We are not a member of NATO simply for altruistic reasons.

By conducting the study in this manner, it will be found that West Germany takes on its fair share of the defense burden.

CHAPTER 2

BURDEN SHARING

Burden sharing is a generic term used by the Atlantic alliance to describe how defense costs are shared among the allies. In this sense, the burden is the amount that NATO costs to maintain an adequate military posture in order to remain an effective deterrent against attack. Sharing refers to the amount of money that each country contributes to this cost. Each country's contribution is judged against a standard NATO guideline as to what counts as spending in this area. This spending is then computed as a percentage of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). From these figures, a judgement is made as to whether a country is adequately contributing to the common defense structure of NATO.

Throughout the history of the Atlantic alliance, burden sharing has been a periodic issue in America. Many ideological and economical arguments have been used to show that the Europeans do not spend as much on NATO, and thus their own defense, as does the United States. Therefore, the United States is taking on too much of the burden to protect Europe.

THE HISTORY OF THE BURDEN SHARING ARGUMENT

Congress raised the issue of whether it was right for the United States to pay so much for participating in the NATO arrangements when the decision was first made to change the status of the American Occupation Forces in Europe into forces that would fall under the NATO command structure (1). President Truman was adamant, however, since he did not want another case of not sending enough aid in time to Europe, such as had occurred prior to the Second World War (2).

As a result of the hearings that occurred in both the House and Senate, it was finally resolved that the United States would provide a number of soldiers to the NATO command structure. The resolution stated that the United States would provide its fair share of the forces (3) which would be commanded by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

NATO'S STRATEGY

During this period, the prevailing strategy was to counter any Soviet attack with a nuclear counterattack. It was felt that since the American nuclear weapons arsenal was so large, the Soviets would not want to face annihilation for actions in Western Europe. The Europeans felt that American troops were necessary, for they insured that any attack in Western Europe would involve these

troops, and thus guarantee America's retaliation. This theory is known as coupling, for it unites the forces of the two continents together.

This policy that guaranteed a nuclear exchange was changed by the Kennedy Administration in the early 60's. In the late 1950's the Soviets developed the means of attacking the United States with both manned bombers and missiles, and it was no longer considered prudent to invite nuclear war for any type of an attack in Europe, without trying to defend first with other means. As a result, the United States adopted a policy still current today known as Flexible Response.

The idea behind Flexible Response is that an attack by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact forces will be met with an adequate sized defense force that can defeat the opponent. If the defenders fail with conventional arms to repel an attack, the battle is escalated to include the use of tactical nuclear weapons. If this fails, theater nuclear weapons will be employed, and if they fail to stop the aggression, strategic nuclear forces will be employed. This policy is supposed to make any aggression by the Soviets too costly to undertake, since they could not hope to achieve any gain greater than their losses once nuclear weapons are used, and thereby deters an attack by the Soviet Union.

There are a few things implicit to this type of

strategy (4). The first is that the forces that will be used to defend against an initial attack must be strong enough to achieve their intended purpose. This means that from the conventional forces all the way up to the strategic nuclear forces, there must be sufficient force to convince the opponent that he will not succeed. The second is that the deterring force must show the will to do what his policy states. In the case of NATO, conventional forces are considered key to prove that the alliance will act in concert to fight an act of aggression. American forces are important to NATO because they serve as a part of the conventional forces. In addition, since the United States is the only country with a nuclear arsenal capable of inflicting massive damage upon the Soviet Union, Europeans consider these soldiers as necessary to couple America to its European allies.

THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENT

In the early 1970's, numerous critics claimed that the Western Europeans were not doing enough to shoulder their share of the defense burden. They pointed out the disparate spending levels between the different countries, and claimed that the United States was spending more than they were to defend Western Europe.

One such critic was Senate Democratic Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who campaigned vigorously in 1973 to

reduce America's presence in Europe. He argued that the Europeans were not contributing adequately towards NATO, and that the reduction of American forces would force them to reappraise, and thus increase their spending. An amendment was initially passed by the Senate that would decrease the number of American military personnel in Europe, but due to a technicality, another vote was necessary later in the day. Strong lobbying by the Nixon Administration caused the amendment to be voted down (5). Shortly thereafter, detente between the United States and the Soviet Union gave way to tensions in the Mid-East, and the amendment was not brought up again.

The Mansfield Amendment did cause the Europeans to reassess the American position, and although they were suffering from a recession, there were numerous high level talks to try and resolve this problem by increasing spending. An agreement was reached in 1977 that each of the NATO members would increase their spending on defense by three per cent each year. This figure was to be computed after allowing for inflation. The problem with this concept was that it did not set any clear goals for what areas would be improved with the increased spending. Rather, it was left to each country to decide where the spending would be. The purpose behind this agreement was more to show alliance solidarity and understanding than it was to effect any real gains in force improvement (6).

THE BURDEN SHARING DEBATE RESUMES

In 1981 Ronald Reagan was sworn in as President and started an enormous spending program on the nation's defense. This spending was necessary to modernize the country's forces whose equipment had not been replaced or upgraded since the end of the Vietnam War. At the same time the Western Europeans were undergoing a recession, which was hurting their efforts to maintain an increased spending in the defense sector. Once again the debate arose that the Europeans needed to do more to share the burden, or else the United States would reduce the size of its force in Europe.

Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia introduced a bill to the Senate in 1984 that would decrease American soldiers stationed in Europe by 30,000 annually unless the Europeans met the three per cent spending increase (7). Senator William Roth wrote:

without additional support from our allies, I doubt that Congress will be willing to continue allocating more than half of the US defense budget for troops, weapons, and support equipment, either stationed in Europe or on standby in the US, ready for rapid deployment to Europe (8).

Strong lobbying by the Reagan Administration caused this bill to be defeated by a narrow margin the same as the Mansfield Amendment in the early 70's, but once again the Europeans were reminded how the Americans viewed their contribution to the NATO alliance.

The burden sharing debate has not only taken place within the government. It has also taken place in the American public with the feeling that it is time for the Europeans to do more for their own defense. Influential American newspapers such as The Washington Post have written that the European leadership is "sloughing off its most vital responsibilities" (9) by not spending more on defense. Irving Kristol wrote in The Wall Street Journal, "Why are we concentrating a major portion of our military expenditures on NATO, when these forces could be put to use elsewhere?" (10). And a recent editorial stated that to increase the deterrent value of NATO, our allies in Europe "need to share more of the burden" (11).

Influential politicians and academics have also entered the argument. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in Time that it was time the Europeans take on more of a responsibility within the Atlantic alliance by, among other things, "assuming the major responsibility for conventional ground defense" (12). Implicit in his argument is that the Europeans need to do more for their defense, and America less. David Calleo of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University wrote in his recent book Beyond American Hegemony, that America's European allies should take "a greater share in the burden of sustaining the international system by taking the lead in providing

their own regional defense" (13). And finally, Melvyn Krauss, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, has written that America subsidizes Europe's defense, a fact that is obvious when one compares the GDP percentages which are spent on defense (14).

DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PORTION OF THE GDP

Table 2.1 on the following page shows a comparison between the United States and West Germany for defense spending between the years 1973 and 1985. Averaging the thirteen years together, it will be found that West Germany spent an average of 3.4% of its GDP on defense, with the lowest figure being 3.3% and the highest 3.6%. The United States, in comparison, has averaged 5.9% of its GDP on defense spending, with a high occurring during the Reagan buildup in 1985 of 6.9% and a low occurring shortly after the Vietnam War with a figure of 5.1%.

There are some problems when making a comparison on burden sharing when using these tables. The data for the United States represent its spending for the military forces required to meet its global commitment, whereas the data for West Germany represent its NATO commitment, since these are the only forces West Germany is allowed to have. A recent study has found that the amount the United States spends to support its NATO commitment is approximately 58%

Table 2.1. Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of
GDP (15)

<u>Year</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>United States</u> *
1973	3.5	6.0 (3.5)
1974	3.6	6.1 (3.5)
1975	3.6	6.0 (3.5)
1976	3.5	5.3 (3.1)
1977	3.4	5.4 (3.1)
1978	3.3	5.1 (3.0)
1979	3.3	5.1 (3.0)
1980	3.3	5.5 (3.2)
1981	3.4	5.8 (3.4)
1982	3.4	6.4 (3.7)
1983	3.4	6.6 (3.8)
1984	3.3	6.5 (3.8)
1985	3.3	6.9 (4.0)
Average	3.4	5.9 (3.4)

* The figures in parentheses indicates United States
spending on NATO.

of its defense budget (16). Recomputing the above averages based on this percentage would show that the United States spent 3.4% of its GDP on defense for NATO, the same as West Germany, and therefore indicates that West Germany is indeed adequately sharing the burden of defense with the United States.

The next problem is that these data do not describe how each country has equipped and manned its forces with its spending. If a country can fulfill its NATO mission and be a credible deterrent, then no matter what the spending data show, that country is sharing the burden. But the only way to determine this is to analyze the military forces rather than the spending levels.

Finally, this comparison does not examine the contributions in other areas that West Germany makes to NATO. These factors will be discussed later, and it will be shown that West Germany's efforts do enhance the deterrent value of its own and its allied forces in a way that is not computed as a portion of the GDP.

CONCLUSION

Burden sharing as a percentage of a country's GDP is just one of the many factors that should be considered when taking into account contributions to the NATO alliance. Relying solely on the amount of money spent

does not, however, adequately show commitment to the alliance, or the value and capabilities of the forces that are used in its support.

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CHAPTER 3

THE ORIGINS OF THE BUNDESWEHR

THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT

Once it was clear that the tide had finally been turned against Germany in the war, the three major powers, England, the Soviet Union and the United States started to draw up plans for post-war Europe. Already in September 1944, Winston Churchill was presented with a plan by the United States Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau that would give Germany only enough industry to provide for its own standard of living. He was opposed to this plan, for he felt that Germany would be needed later on in order to balance the strength of the Soviet Union, but he felt that he should go along with the Americans since Great Britain would need their help to rebuild after the war (1). The purpose behind this plan was to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the world peace. Germany had been responsible for starting two major wars on the European continent within the span of two decades. By preventing her from ever again having an industrial base, the United States hoped to prevent any chance of another war in Europe.

Further agreements between the three powers divided Germany into three equal sectors, each to be administered

by one of the three powers. Later, France became a party to these conferences and was also given a sector to administer. Repayments for war debts would come out of these sectors, with the western sectors also providing payment to the Soviet Union. Under these agreements, Berlin was also divided into four sectors.

It became apparent shortly after the war that the harmony and cooperation between the Four Powers would not last. Changes in leadership in America and England brought new men to office that had not participated in the original conferences. Most apparent was President Truman's dislike of having to deal with Joseph Stalin, and his mistrust of the Soviet leader. Also, with the war being over, the necessity for cooperation was no longer the driving force behind diplomatic interchanges. As a result, each of the Four Powers administered their own sectors of responsibility with little thought of what went on in the other areas (2).

The tensions finally came to a head with the Berlin Crisis of 1948. In an effort to establish control over all of Berlin, the Soviet Union blockaded the city so that supplies could not be transported by road or rail to West Berlin. The other three powers showed their resolve to maintain sovereignty in West Berlin with the famous Berlin Airlift. By maintaining for twelve months a steady stream of supplies brought in on cargo planes to West Berlin, the

western power's resolve was proven, and the Soviets backed down.

As the Soviet Union continued to subjugate Eastern European governments to its control, the western powers realized that something was needed to provide for the defense of Western Europe. In early 1948 a treaty was enacted between England, France and the Benelux countries to provide for their common defense in case one or all of them were attacked. Talks were already underway when President Truman was approached by the British about joining the alliance with the Europeans. The United States was supplying millions of dollars worth of goods and equipment to the Europeans in the form of the Marshall Plan. Therefore, President Truman felt that the United States needed to do more to bolster the Western European's self-confidence by showing American resolve to help defend them. With this in mind, the United States joined in the conferences from which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was born (3).

The organization was initially set up as a group of military planning staffs that planned for the defense of Western Europe. The countries that were signatory to the treaty pledged to come to the aid of any one of the others if attacked. The United States provided the military leader of the organization, and pledged to support the alliance with its military power in the form of

conventional forces, but especially with its nuclear weapons. It was felt that this organization was sufficient to convince the Soviet Union of the common commitment to defend Western Europe against an attack.

The North Korean attack against South Korea in June 1950 caused many to fear the same type of attack would occur in Europe. New talks developed among the Europeans about forming a Western European Union which would provide forces in order to deter attack. These talks stalled because the English did not want to see West Germany rearmed. In addition, the West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, refused to take part in any such defense scheme unless West Germany was given equal status in the partnership with the other nations.

THE REARMAMENT DEBATE

The United States wanted to find a quick solution to setting up a credible deterrent force in Europe because United States forces were becoming increasingly involved in the Korean fighting and could not defend Europe adequately. Not realizing the European sensitivity to the issue, the President suggested that the West Germans be recognized as a sovereign state, that occupation forces currently on West German soil change their mission to that of defending West Germany, and that the West Germans start forming an army. This plan met great resistance from the

Europeans. Instead, they wanted to continue negotiations that would provide a common defense in the Western European Union type arrangement.

The British were finally convinced to go along with this idea. As a result of negotiations in 1952, a plan was developed known as the European Defense Community. It was decided that a supranational European army would be raised to defend Western Europe. In an effort to solve the problem of a rearmed Germany, all these forces would fall under the command of a single leader, with the individual nations having little control over the forces from their country. Agreements were reached between France, Great Britain and America that would recognize West Germany as a sovereign state when the treaty was ratified by all members. By 1954, political tensions had mounted in France against the idea of French forces falling under the command of an authority besides the French government, and that the Germans would once again be allowed to have an army. As a result, the French Assembly refused to ratify the treaty, and it seemed as if all the results of previous negotiations would fail. At this point, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden proposed a compromise solution. Rather than placing all forces into a supranational army and command structure, armies would be raised and placed in the command structure of NATO, with each country having ultimate control over

its own forces. West Germany would be allowed to rearm with certain restrictions. These restrictions consisted of limitations on weapons that the Germans could have, the West German government would not have any control over its forces, and the German army would not be allowed to have any type of General Staff. In addition, West Germany would not be allowed to have any other armed forces except those which were a part of NATO; and German forces larger than a corps would not be assigned sectors of responsibility next to each other (4). These restrictions remain today.

INTERNAL DEBATE OVER REARMAMENT

Konrad Adenauer had to overcome more than just external opposition to the rearming of Germany. West Germany was still suffering from the effects of the war. People were still homeless or living in substandard housing, there was a sense of shame that still lingered from the war, and the occupying forces of the victorious countries were a daily reminder that Germany was a vanquished nation. For this reason, Adenauer was working against strong opposition that was forming across West Germany against the rearmament issue.

The public was naturally fearful about the rise of an army when their democratic state was so young. Since at least the seventeenth century, and certainly from the

nineteenth century until World War Two, the military had been an important actor in German government. The leadership of the army, to large extent, came from the elite upper classes. They formed a hierarchy within German government, and the effectiveness of the government depended to a large extent on its ability to maintain control of this elite group (5). Therefore, the idea of a new military elite developing within society caused many people to fear a return to old political systems.

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the major opposition party to Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), was opposed to the plan to rearm due to the political ramifications of Germany not being reunited in the future because of this army (6). They felt that any undertaking that gave the Soviets the impression that Germany was a militant state against the Soviets would nullify any possibility of a future reunification. Also, as nuclear weapons became the primary means of retaliation against a Soviet attack in Europe, the SPD felt that an army of any size was unnecessary because no amount of conventional forces would be able to defend against a conventional Soviet attack (7).

In addition to the SPD, many other organizations were against West Germany having an army. The German Trade Unions, a large number of church groups, and the universities were also against rearmament. Their chief

concerns were the same as those of the SPD. The only difference is that unlike the SPD who were willing to debate the issue in government to try and work out compromise arrangements with the majority CDU (8), these groups were opposed to any type of accommodation, and showed their dissent by labor strikes and protest (9). The most serious protest came from the ranks of young men who would fill this prospective army. Public opposition to rearmament was commonplace among them and at times turned to violence. In Cologne and again in Augsburg, senior government officials were shouted down and injured by flying objects when they tried to explain how the conscription system would work (10). The Adenauer government was hard pressed from many sectors of society concerning this unpopular measure.

The other NATO members did nothing to help in allaying the fears of the West German people. The current NATO strategy consisted of a defense in depth type arrangement, whereby NATO forces would fall back to succeeding defensive positions to wear down attacking Soviet forces. Once they were sufficiently weakened, NATO would counterattack and push them back across the border. The West German public did not like the idea of their homeland being used as the battleground where NATO would give up land in order to slow down attacking forces, and then later counterattack across that same territory. They

also did not understand why they were going to support West German soldiers who would not even be used to defend the homeland against attack, but rather be used as a part of this NATO strategy (11). In June 1955, a massive military maneuver called Carte Blanche took place in West Germany that simulated a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Magazines such as Der Spiegel explained for the first time to the German people the effects such a nuclear war would have upon the population, and caused great fear among the populace (12).

The ability of Konrad Adenauer to maintain party discipline is probably the main reason that this measure was finally approved by the German parliament. In so doing, the parliament ensured that the military would remain subordinate to the civilian government by enacting measures discussed below. West Germany not only gained recognition as a sovereign state, but it was also able to extract pledges from the other NATO members as a result of joining NATO. West Germany proclaimed the Hallstein Doctrine which stressed the government's goal for the eventual reunification of the two Germanies, and the promise that diplomatic ties would be severed with any nation except the Soviet Union that recognized East Germany (13). In so doing, Konrad Adenauer was able to start West Germany on its first steps in transforming from a conquered nation to a member of the world community.

THE BUNDESWEHR IS FORMED

When Secretary of State Dean Acheson first suggested that West Germany should be rearmed, Adenauer appointed Theodor Blank as Commissioner of Security to study and make recommendations for what form the army should take to avoid repeating Germany's past history with the military. Blank brought together people from many fields and disciplines and formed them into a group that would come to be known as Dienststelle Blank. This commission studied the problems of a new West German Army from both the technical and philosophical aspects. However, the major contribution of Dienststelle Blank would be in the philosophical grounding of the Bundeswehr (14).

The members of Dienststelle Blank realized that tradition in military units is necessary in order to build esprit de corps. Tradition stems from faithful and loyal service to the nation, something which the Germans did not have. In order to overcome this problem, Dienststelle Blank recommended that the army follow two courses of action. The first course would be to found the Bundeswehr as a group of citizen-soldiers. This would obviate the possibility of the army becoming an elite caste within society. The best way to accomplish this would be to have an army that was mainly conscripted from the population of young German males. Soldiers would be trained and serve a

short time in the military, but would not give up their rights as citizens. Part of their training would teach what their rights were, and would stress the fact that they were citizens in uniform. In so doing, faithful and loyal service could be founded in the principles of democracy.

The second course of action was designed to provide the soldier with an education that would give him a moral sense of his profession. This training would be called Innere Fuehrung, and would inculcate the values needed by a soldier so that he could make rational decisions rather than following orders through blind obedience (15).

To implement these concepts, each soldier, officer or enlisted man would attend instruction during his training in order to help him identify and understand the values of Innere Fuehrung. Dienststelle Blank provided the West German government a set of guidelines with which it could go about setting up its forces, and provided a philosophical framework which the military could use to serve society.

The German parliament also wanted to be sure that the army would never have the power of previous German armies. They debated the different bills that came before their bodies and voted down those which they felt gave the army too much power (16). As a result of these debates, the Bundeswehr was placed under civilian control by making the

commander of the army the minister of defense, who would be responsible to the Federal Chancellor for the running and administration of the military. The parliament also established a separate investigative agency that would work outside the military systems known as an Ombudsman. All units in the Bundeswehr of division size or greater would be assigned an Ombudsman that would monitor developments and investigate complaints made by soldiers. Ultimately, the Ombudsman was made responsible to the Parliament and was required to report yearly to the Bundestag.

After five long years of debate, protest, discussion and studies, the Bundeswehr was formed. In 1955 the first group of soldiers reported for training and in 1956, compulsory service began.

CONCLUSION

The post-war settlement between the Four Powers was a plan that would ensure Germany remained weak. As Cold War tensions increased, West Germany's power was needed to help deter Soviet aggression. The government of Konrad Adenauer worked with political skill and patience to meet the needs of the NATO alliance, and thereby secured for West Germany an equal status among nations. The agreements and regulations that allowed West Germany to have an army ensured that it would never fall under the

command of a German leader by subordinating it to the NATO command structure. The role of the soldier as a citizen and as a part of society were stressed, and the moral values of democracy were reinforced through training. These basic structures and principles which founded the military remain in place today, and are an important consideration when contemplating any change to the present structure of NATO.

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CHAPTER 4

THE BUNDESWEHR AS A PART OF NATO

There are two reasons why using a country's defense spending as a percentage of its GDP is not a good gauge for measuring a country's military contributions to the alliance. The first is that this spending is a measure of input rather than output. This means that there is no real indication of how the country is spending its money in order to man and equip its forces. With the high cost of research, development and the final production of today's high technology weapons, it is quite possible that the defense spending supports an armed force that is overall incapable of fighting due to the lack of an adequate amount of equipment. The second reason is that spending levels do not show the manning and equipment levels and how those forces are configured in order to face the enemy. In order to effectively analyze the Bundeswehr's capability as a fighting force, it is important to understand the overall NATO strategy and the type of Warsaw Pact forces that NATO is likely to face, and then examine how the Bundeswehr contributes to overall force structure within NATO.

NATO'S STRATEGY

The strategy of NATO since its beginning has been deterrence. During the Eisenhower Administration the United States supported this strategy with its nuclear superiority over the Soviets by guaranteeing that any form of Soviet attack would be met with an American nuclear response. This doctrine, known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), was rejected by the Kennedy Administration and replaced with the Flexible Response strategy which is still in use today.

There are two basic forms of deterrence: denial and punishment (1). Under the Flexible Response strategy both of these forms are met. Denial is provided by the strong conventional forces that man the NATO front. Punishment is provided by the nuclear forces available to the alliance which will be used if the conventional forces fail. There are various levels of nuclear weapons, starting with the short range tactical which can inflict damage upon forces on the battlefield and going up through increasing levels of destructiveness to America's strategic forces which can strike the Soviet Union.

The assumption behind this strategy is that any potential enemy will compare the advantage he could gain by attacking a NATO member country successfully against what the attack may cost in destruction of his own forces, equipment and homeland. It is assumed that no enemy force

will risk destruction of his homeland for whatever gains might be had in Western Europe.

The NATO alliance projects both conventional and nuclear strength which promises to meet any Warsaw Pact attack with increasing levels of destruction up to and including America's strategic nuclear forces to insure an attack would be too costly to be worthwhile.

What is not apparent in this strategy is that it is a defensive strategy. This means that it is not necessary to match the attacking forces man for man and gun for gun. This is because there are certain advantages of strength that accrue to the defensive forces which can be exploited quite easily.

In the defense the defender knows the terrain and can use it to his advantage. Terrain can be used to conceal troop movements so that defensive forces can move into position unobserved. Warsaw Pact doctrine calls for swift, bold advances which by their nature mean movement in the open to take advantage of speed. Terrain can be used in conjunction with other military measures such as obstacles to force the enemy into areas that will hinder his movement, thus slowing the momentum of his advance and making him vulnerable to counterattack. The defender can prepare fighting positions in advance that will protect men and equipment and give them a better chance of surviving the fight, whereas the attacking force is in the

open and vulnerable to defensive fires and counterattack. The advantage of the defense is so strong that Soviet doctrine considers a total force ratio of three to one necessary before undertaking offensive operations (2). The goal of NATO is to ensure that an effective deterrence against attack is maintained by keeping its force levels high enough within the alliance so that the Warsaw Pact forces could never achieve a superiority over them. In so doing, they only need to maintain sufficient strength for a defensive role, and thus do not need to maintain the size force needed for the more aggressive offensive operations.

A COMPARISON OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN EUROPE

The concern behind the burden sharing argument is that because so little money is spent on defense, the NATO forces are dangerously weaker than the Warsaw Pact forces (3). The evidence supports this argument when a simple force comparison is made between NATO and Warsaw Pact active and reserve forces and their equipment. The table on the following page shows such an analysis (4).

These figures should not be accepted solely upon their face value. The figures show that NATO is weak in manpower, armored vehicles and active and total divisions; and seriously deficient in mechanized infantry combat vehicles and artillery since a minor reinforcement before

Table 4.1. Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces

MANPOWER (x1000)	NATO	WP	RATIO
Active	796	995	1 : 1.25
Active & Reserve	1 718	2 025	1 : 1.2
Divisions:			
Active	32 1/3	48 2/3	1 : 1.5
Active and Res.	44 1/3	56 2/3	1 : 1.3
Major Weapons:			
Tanks	12 700	18 000	1 : 1.4
MICV (a)	3 400	8 000	1 : 2.4
Artillery	3 600	9 500	1 : 2.6
ATGM (b)	6 800	4 770	1.4 : 1
(a) Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle			
(b) Anti-Tank Guided Missile			

an attack would enable the Warsaw Pact to gain a three to one advantage. However, taking into account the quality of weapons will shed a more accurate light on the relative strength of the two sides.

The quality of weapons need to be considered because the NATO forces are generally equipped with weapons that are more technologically advanced than the Warsaw Pact forces, who maintain large quantities of old weapons. An example of this is the tanks that are a part of the Polish army which were built in 1955, and a large number of the same vehicles that make up other Warsaw Pact active and reserve forces. The majority of NATO tanks were built between the mid 70's and early 80's with only about 25 per cent being built in 1966 and 1967 (5). The same holds true for all other classes of weapons in the comparison between forces.

These newer weapon systems have many advantages over their older counterparts. Their improved armor protection makes them impervious to the firepower of the older weapons. Advanced optics enable soldiers to see and fire their weapons in periods of low visibility such as darkness, fog, smoke or haze. These are only two examples of the many advantages. In order to make up for these technological advantages in weaponry, the United States Army devised a system that takes into account the overall advantages of different weapons which are in service in

the various countries.

The standard system of measurement is known as an Armored Division Equivalent (ADE) which is based on figures derived by combining the effectiveness of all weapons in an American armored division. For example, a standard United States battle tank is given a value of 60 units. These units are then multiplied by different factors depending on whether the tank is to be used in an offensive or a defensive role. This number is then multiplied by the total number of tanks within the division. All weapon systems are tallied in this manner, with the grand total being the value of 1 ADE. In a calculation such as this, weapons of inferior quality will yield lower ADE's while a better equipped force will bring a higher valued ADE. A standard Warsaw Pact division has an ADE of 0.66 (6).

Comparing the figures of ADE's between the two forces results in a set of ratios quite different than those derived from a straight count. The present force structure gives the Warsaw Pact a total ADE advantage of 1.2:1 (7). Assuming both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces begin mobilization for war at roughly the same time, this force ratio does not change considerably (8).

A recent study was conducted by F. W. von Mellenthin, R. H. S. Stofli and E. Sobik that not only assessed the technological advantages that NATO has over the Warsaw

Pact forces, but also looks at some intangible factors such as morale, motivation, leadership, and initiative which are also important when judging military strengths and weaknesses. It is interesting to note that two of these authors have experience in the subject matter which supports their extensive research. Von Mellenthin served for 21 months between 1942 and 1944 as chief of staff of a German Panzer Corps and Panzer Army, and is widely respected for his knowledge of modern armored warfare. Sobik also served in the German Army during the war and saw action as a line officer fighting the Soviets. He later served in the Bundeswehr as a company and battalion commander, and finally as the Chief Intelligence Officer for NATO's Central Army Group before his retirement. These authors conclude that NATO not only has a technological advantage, but also an advantage in the intangible factors which affects the overall fighting capability of military units (9).

Even with the data presented thus far, there are some influential people who understand these force comparisons and still worry about the conventional balance of forces in Western Europe. They put forth the possibility of a massed Soviet surprise attack where the Soviets are able to bring a large number of forces together in order to make a single, decisive thrust into Western Europe (10).

The problem with this assumption is that the only way

a decisive thrust could be made is if the Soviets could mass their forces without being detected. Modern surveillance techniques would prevent this from occurring and therefore requires that they attack with forces that are already in position. As a result, the attack would be made with approximately 24 Warsaw Pact divisions against NATO's 28, a ratio that becomes even more favorable when the forces are compared using their ADE's (11).

Conventional forces currently stationed in Western Europe, both reserve and active, are strong enough to prevent a decisive Soviet victory under any attack scenario, and are therefore an effective deterrent force. Even if Warsaw pact planners felt they could eventually overcome and defeat the conventional forces, they would still face the risk of nuclear war, something they would probably not want to chance. Whether or not these NATO forces will continue to maintain the balance in the future remains to be seen, but based on the past 35 years of success, it is safe to assume that NATO will continue to be a major factor for the continuing peace in Europe.

THE BUNDESWEHR'S CONTRIBUTION TO DETERRENCE

It has been explained that NATO's goal is to deter aggression by maintaining an overall strength that prevents the Warsaw Pact from gaining an advantage in force ratios. In order to examine whether or not West

Germany is contributing its fair share, two sets of numbers need to be examined: the size of the Bundeswehr and the number of ADE's that make up the total force.

Equipping and maintaining an modern armored force is expensive, and it should therefore be no surprise that West Germany does not contribute as many ADE's to NATO as does the United States. The United States contributes approximately 22 per cent of the total ADE's to Western Europe whereas West Germany contributes 10 per cent of the total (12). Whether this is an adequate contribution should be judged by the size of America's GDP against the size of West Germany's GDP.

In Chapter 2 it was shown that the United States contributed approximately the same amount of its GDP to the NATO defenses as West Germany. However, West Germany's GDP is slightly less than one fifth the size of the United States' GDP. If defense spending were an accurate gauge of burden sharing, West Germany would only provide one fifth of the ADE's that the United States does. The fact that it provides half of the ADE's in relation to the United States points out one problem of the GDP type comparison.

In addition, this comparison does not show that West Germany provides two more active divisions to the defense of Central Europe than does the United States. West Germany currently has 12 active divisions compared to

America's 4 2/3 divisions in Europe. This number can be increased to 10 divisions within ten days of mobilization due to the positioning of all the necessary equipment in Europe (13). After these initial divisions arrive and draw their equipment, the next forces that can arrive ready for combat will take at least thirty days. This is due to the fact that all vehicles and heavy equipment will have to be transported by sea or air, with the majority going by sea (14). In the first thirty days, West Germany will contribute more to the defenses of NATO than will the United States since West Germany's reserve forces need only be activated and issued equipment to be ready for combat.

Contributions of manpower as a total percent of the population runs fairly even between the United States and West Germany. Active forces make up approximately 8 per cent of the population in both countries, and active and reserves make up 1.4 per cent of the population in the United States compared with 1.8 per cent in West Germany. This is another factor that should be considered when looking at total force contribution to NATO, since West Germany has only one quarter of America's population but provides one half of the forces that America does to NATO.

CONCLUSION

Defense spending is only one way to measure a

country's input to the NATO defense effort. Looking closely at the forces shows to a better degree what a country's military contribution is to the alliance. West Germany's contribution in relation to that of the United States shows that with one quarter of the population and one fifth of the GDP it contributes the same number of forces that the United States does that would fight in the first stages of a war.

ENDNOTES

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3. See Chapter 2, endnotes 8, 9 and 11.
4. The data in this table represent the men and equipment in the West Germany and the Benelux countries for NATO, and those in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia for the Warsaw Pact. It would be these forces engaged in the initial fighting if war occurred in Central Europe. French forces currently stationed in West Germany are included in these figures (see discussion in Chapter 7), while those in France are not. If they were added, they would add to the overall combat power of NATO. These data come from: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1987-1988 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987).
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8. If the Warsaw Pact were somehow able to begin mobilization seven days before NATO, the ratio shifts in favor of the Warsaw Pact. A possible reason for this mobilization time advantage would be the delay caused by Western political leaders who would be reluctant to start the procedures of shifting to a war posture. For a

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11. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 171-176; Congressional Record, February 7, 1977: H911-914; and Richard K. Betts, "Hedging Against Surprise Attack," Survival 23 (July-August 1981): 146-148.

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13. Diego A. Ruix Palmer, "The Front Line in Europe - The Forces: National Contributions," Armed Forces Journal International May 1984: 55-58.

14. Deborah G. Meyer, "You Can't Be There Till You Get There!" Armed Forces Journal International June 1984: 76-91.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL COSTS

The assumption behind the burden sharing argument is that the figures that represent a country's spending as a portion of its GDP are an accurate gauge in showing that country's support and commitment to NATO. But in actuality, these figures represent what a country spends on defense based on a narrow, standardized definition agreed upon by NATO members on what constitutes NATO spending, and are only a part of the total contribution to the alliance. Upon closer examination it will be found that West Germany makes certain sacrifices and contributes support outside of the accepted spending definitions that are just as important to the alliance as the military spending and should be taken into account when talking of equitable burden sharing.

A DEFINITION OF SOCIAL COST

The term social cost seems to be the best way to describe these contributions which fall outside the definition of NATO defense spending. The term can be used to describe the many factors that support the NATO alliance but are not included in the burden sharing calculation, and can be divided into three separate and

distinct categories.

The first category pertains to public support of NATO and its military forces. This support can range anywhere from support of the government which allows it to remain in the NATO alliance, to assistance provided to military forces in West Germany which aids them in doing their job.

Although an overall dollar figure cannot be assigned to what public support costs, its importance in the overall scheme of the alliance should not be discounted. Just as the strategy of the alliance is to deter aggression by convincing the enemy that his costs would be too high if he attacked, so must this strategy convince the public that it is their best alternative for security from attack. In a liberal democracy the people elect their government based upon their perception of how well the government can work in their best interests. The government in power must show that it can do this, or the electorate will select a new leadership. If the public felt that their security needs could be fulfilled better outside the alliance, the government would soon have to bow to their demands or be replaced.

Conditions have changed since West Germany first joined NATO in the early 50's. The majority of the population were not a part of the generation that lived through the Second World War and the post-war rebuilding. The government no longer has the freedom it once did in

formulating policy, because the public is better informed and more likely to challenge policies they do not like. Public support of the government is necessary if West Germany is to remain a part of NATO.

Public support also adds credibility to the deterrent value of the military forces. A potential enemy constantly evaluates factors such as this to see if public pressure would impede the mobilization and defense strategy of the military. A military response is not required when a NATO member is attacked since the treaty requires the members to provide only what aid they feel they can. If an attack were to occur outside of Germany, lack of public support could render the alliance ineffectual by causing a delay in the critical time needed for the mobilization of reserve forces by the debate that would ensue due to the lack of faith in NATO.

Another category of social cost is the opportunity cost of being a member of the alliance. Support of military programs requires the government to divert money and effort away from other programs. It also affects the government's foreign and domestic policy, for these must be coordinated, to some degree, with the goals of the alliance. I will not discuss this cost since all members contribute to a fairly equal degree in this area.

The final category is host nation support which entails military and civil programs undertaken by the

government that do not count as a part of the NATO military spending. These programs include both those that increase the deterrent value that NATO forces project, or programs that will increase the combat effectiveness or the survivability of forces if war breaks out.

Social costs are not unique to West Germany in the NATO alliance, but no member country contributes as much as the West Germans in this area. These costs are an important factor in showing support and commitment to the alliance and should be considered as a part of the burden sharing figures.

THE DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC SUPPORT

Perhaps one of the reasons that burden sharing is such a popular argument for Americans is because the dollar figures reported accurately represent America's commitment to its various alliances and treaties, and its own self defense. America is a large country that can afford the luxury of devoting large amounts of land in sparsely populated areas for military bases. In most of these areas the towns came after the military base, and the local economy is supported mainly by the employment opportunities the military base provides or the business soldiers and their families create for local merchants. The training that goes on at these bases does not affect local towns for there is enough land on the base to serve

what is needed for maneuvers. In America, there are few, if any, sacrifices made by civilians to support these forces. This is even more true for the forces America supports overseas, for they do not have any interaction with Americans living in the United States.

The ability of America to provide large portions of land for military training is a stark contrast to the conditions in West Germany. West Germany is a country roughly the size of the state of Oregon and has a population of approximately 63 million people. Not included in this population figure are the number of foreign military personnel and their family members from the seven different countries that station troops in West Germany. For the United States this number is approximately 250,000 military personnel and 650,000 family members. Other armies make up an additional 150,000 forces plus their family members. The large population that must occupy the relatively small area forces West Germany to allocate the use of its land differently. This means that the majority of the population and industries are located within the the cities and towns, and that the remaing land is used extensively for agriculture or forest preserves.

Unlike America, most bases in West Germany are in places that did not have a military base until World War Two. They are located in a variety of places, from towns

of a few thousand people where foreign forces are almost as large as the local population, to large cities such as Frankfurt where the bases are located well within the city limits. For the most part, the local West German population can not help but be aware of the military forces, because these forces conduct training on a daily basis in the areas that belong to the communities around the military bases.

The size of the forces which take part in this type of training varies. Official figures indicate that the yearly average includes 3 to 4 corps exercises with at least 40,000 soldiers and 10,000 vehicles, 10 divisional exercises with at least 10,000 soldiers taking part, 80 individual exercises with at least 2,000 soldiers and over 5,000 exercises lasting 3 to 4 days with up to 2,000 soldiers (1). Each year, a major exercise takes place known as the Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) which engages at least 100,000 soldiers in West Germany, and a sizable number of forces flown in as reinforcements from the United States. The last such exercise took place in 1987 and involved an additional 30,000 troops and 11,000 vehicles from America (2).

Training exercises such as these disrupt the normal lifestyle of the population to a degree that I do not think the average American could understand. Having served for five years in various positions in the United

States Army in Europe, I can say through my personal experiences that our forces intruded into the daily lives of the West Germans, but the way in which they treated American soldiers never showed that they minded the disruption.

The majority of the exercises in which I took part required my unit to move late at night or early in the morning. Army vehicles are large and noisy and could not have failed to wake people that lived along the roadways in the towns through which we moved. But the only people I saw at these times were the ones out along the road waving to the soldiers as they went by. I am certain that there were people that minded being woken up at these hours, but they never voiced their displeasure so that I became aware of it. Our unit would also set up operations directly within these small villages where soldiers would position their vehicles and set up their tents and equipment in backyards or between houses. Virtually every time that we did this, the local town people would take care of the soldiers by letting them shower in their houses or sleep in their barns, and by bringing them food and hot or cold drinks. Actions such as these showed that there was local support for the training that was taking place.

When training takes place like this in areas where military vehicles and civilian roads, vehicles and

buildings come together, some damage is bound to occur. Although all the military forces go to great lengths to avoid causing damage, some of it is inevitable due to the large vehicles that have trouble maneuvering on the small roads, and some of it occurs by accident or human oversight. This damage can range from something as small as a crushed curb from a tank that cut a turn too short to a house destroyed by a vehicle when it lost its brakes going down a hill. Most of this damage is not reported and is simply repaired by the local citizens. However, the damage caused by American forces that was reported during the first seven months of 1984 amounted to \$21 million (3). I doubt that Americans would be as patient and supportive of military exercises such as these taking place in their communities.

Training is the cornerstone of a military unit's being ready to fight. To be fully effective the training needs to take place in as close a set of conditions in which a future war might be fought. The ease with which training can take place in West Germany and the public support for this training is not a quantifiable contribution to the deterrent value of NATO forces, but it is a support that should be considered when speaking of contributions to the alliance.

Another difference in public support comes in the differences between the way West Germans and Americans man

their armed forces. Since the early 70's America has maintained its forces through voluntary enlistments. West Germany on the other hand maintains its forces through conscription. The differences in military spending that these force structures create are significant.

For the United States to maintain the required level of forces, it must be able to compete in pay and benefits at the same level as United States industry. This causes the government to pay a higher salary to its soldiers than West Germany. During a period of active duty which lasts fifteen months, the West German government provides for its soldiers the same benefit of housing, clothing, medical care and food as does the United States. However, an American soldier is paid a monthly salary of \$620.70 upon entry, which at the end of fifteen months should be raised to \$782.10 per month if the soldier follows the normal promotion schedule (4). A West German conscript receives DM 255 per month upon entry, and by the end of his fifteen month term of service receives DM 300 (5). Using the current rate of exchange of DM 1.65 to the dollar, this equates to \$154.55 and \$181.82 respectively. This large difference in pay is a significant cost when it supports a large armed force.

It has been estimated that the differences in pay between American and German forces could be as much as one percentage point in the GDP (6). Going back to the

figures presented in the second chapter on burden sharing and using this estimate, West Germany's spending on defense would equate to 4.3 per cent of its GDP in 1985 as compared to America's 6.9 per cent overall spending and the estimated 4 per cent NATO spending.

Maintaining a conscript force is also different for the young men involved because of the sacrifice they must make to serve. Being taken away from the civilian jobs they might otherwise have, they earn a far lower wage in the military than they would in the private sector. It also delays any plans they might have for the future such as marriage. In a volunteer force, the soldier is in the service by choice, and if a sacrifice is involved, it is made out of free will. This is just another example of an unquantifiable cost that allows West Germany to support its NATO commitment that is not considered as a part of the burden sharing debate.

HOST NATION SUPPORT

Defense spending in NATO is generally considered to be any funds allocated for manning, equipping, training and maintaining the nation's armed forces. Because of this limited definition of defense spending and some agreements that were made before NATO was founded and remain in effect, West Germany contributes funds and manpower to NATO that do not count as a part of their

defense effort.

The city of West Berlin is a prime example of West German defense spending that does not count as NATO spending. Part of the agreements that allowed West Germany to rearm stipulated that its military forces could not be used to try and attain reunification with East Germany. If the Soviets were to try and subjugate West Berlin to their control as they had during the Berlin Blockade of 1948 and 1949, the use of West German forces could violate this agreement since the only way that mechanized forces could go to the aid of West Berlin would be by road or rail through East Germany, something the East Germans could prevent which would then cause a confrontation between the two Germanies. Continuing the occupation status of the American, French and British forces would keep in force the agreements with the Soviet Union that allows the allies free and unrestricted access to Berlin, an agreement over which East Germany has no control.

The post-war settlement required West Germany to pay the costs of all occupation forces in its territory. Since this requirement was not changed upon West Germany's entry into NATO, it still must pay for the foreign occupation forces in West Berlin. This amounts to a total dollar figure of approximately \$7 billion per year, which is one third of the total amount that West Germany spent

on NATO in 1985. If spending on West Berlin were added to the NATO spending figure, the defense spending would rise from 3.3 per cent to 4.3 per cent of the GDP (7).

Another example is an initiative known as Wartime Host Nation Support. In 1982 the United States became concerned that soldiers sent overseas as reinforcements in time of hostilities would have trouble getting ready to fight once they arrived in Germany. Without an adequate number of American support personnel to aid in the drawing of prepositioned vehicles and supplies, these forces would take an inordinate amount of time to become fully operational and ready for combat. As a result, the United States entered into negotiations with the West German government to provide this support. West Germany has dedicated a 93,000 man civilian force which has been trained to aid American soldiers upon arrival. They will perform various duties such as airfield security and repair, the transporting of men and equipment to the required destinations, and evacuating casualties to local military hospitals (8).

It is obvious that the Wartime Host Nation Support agreement will aid tremendously the efficiency of NATO's fighting forces. But since this manpower is not considered a part of the military forces, neither it nor the money committed to the force is considered a part of the NATO defense spending. The manpower committed to this

force equals approximately 7 per cent of the West German 1.2 million active and reserve forces, and costs approximately \$450 million yearly to maintain (9).

Host nation support is not confined solely to manpower and its associated costs. West Germany must build its roadways and bridges to be able to support military vehicles that weigh 60 tons and over. This adds considerably to the construction costs for it requires extra labor and material to do the job adequately. Being ready to support military forces in time of war causes the government to have to support the building of reinforced airfields that can support heavy bombers and transport aircraft, and reinforced pipe lines that are built much sturdier than they would be for simple civilian use. Redundancy is built into communication networks so that the destruction of one or two facilities will not render the entire telephone and radio network inoperable.

A final factor that adds to NATO readiness is a program that keeps track of all trucks that could be used by NATO forces for transportation purposes in war time. The West German government maintains a registry that lists the vehicle's location and capability, which could be a critical asset when mobilized to deliver supplies in time of conflict. This program closely parallels the type of program that keeps track of reserve military manpower so that the reserve forces can be activated in war. The only

difference is that the transportation program is not considered a NATO program.

CONCLUSION

The United States considers burden sharing to be the equitable sharing of the costs necessary to maintain an adequate NATO military deterrence. But in the view of the United States, this means that the amount of money contributed by each member country. This parochial view enables the United States to ignore the unique contributions made by a country such as West Germany which should be a factor when considering an equitable sharing of burdens.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER 6

BENEFITS

West Germany's participation in the Atlantic alliance would not be beneficial unless the country received something in return for its participation. If this were just an alliance to which West Germany contributed without a return, public support for participation in NATO would soon dry up and would cause the government to reconsider its obligations under the treaty. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the benefits that West Germany receives from its participation in NATO, and to see whether it would be possible for West Germany to receive these same benefits another way given the current set of conditions in Europe. It will also be found that some of the benefits that West Germany receives also serve to strengthen the alliance as a whole.

THE MILITARY BENEFITS OF NATO

A democratic country must be able to defend itself in order to insure the continuation of the democratic process and protect it from disruption by outside forces. The obvious benefit that West Germany receives from its NATO alliance is help in providing for its defense, and the guarantee that it will be helped if attacked by another

country. Since at least the seventeenth century wars of increasing destructiveness have been fought upon the European continent, during which Germany was either a participant, or served as the route of invasion for the warring powers. The NATO alliance was formed to prevent a future war in Europe, and has thus far been successful. To determine if the NATO alliance is a benefit to West Germany, the question of whether or not West Germany could provide for its own defense under the present circumstances must be examined.

When a country considers what forces it needs to defend itself, it must take into account many factors. The first, and most important, is the potential enemy. The size of his force, armaments, and the likely routes of attack are all taken into consideration. Another factor the country considers is the resources it has available to meet this threat and how it will employ them. Certain types of forces, such as those which consist predominantly of armored vehicles, are very costly to build and maintain, but necessary when facing an enemy that is equipped with armored forces. Another such resource is the manpower that is available that will make up the armed forces. This requires a decision on the size of the active and reserve portion of the force, and the type of training soldiers will receive. The final factor which must be taken into account is what type of alliances exist

that would help if attacked. An alliance's forces contribute to the overall defense effort, and reduce the need for a military force fully capable of fighting the expected battle, since the sum of the alliance's forces will be used. Once all of these factors have been taken into account, the country then decides how much of the national resources will be dedicated to defense and nondefense areas.

There are two countries near West Germany that have also faced the need of providing for their defense, and have a liberal democratic form of government like West Germany. One country is Sweden which has maintained a neutral status rather than joining the NATO alliance, and Austria, whose neutrality in 1955 was a condition set by the Soviets before they withdrew their occupation forces. Examining Table 6.1 on the following page shows that the defense efforts by these two countries compares quite closely to that of West Germany.

One of the main reasons that Austria's defense spending is so low is that it maintains a predominantly infantry force, with only 170 tanks, compared with Sweden's 870 tanks and West Germany's 4,662 tanks, and an air force of only 32 combat aircraft compared to Sweden's 501 and West Germany's 604 combat aircraft (2). It is much cheaper to maintain an infantry force than it is

Table 6.1 Comparison of Defense Effort for 1986 (1)

	Austria	Sweden	W. Germany
Total Population	7 553 000	8 381 000	61 123 000
Active Duty Mil	54 700 (.7%)	67 000 (.8%)	495 000(.8%)
Total, Active	240 700	850 000	1 265 000
and Reserves	(3.2%)	(10.1%)	(2%)
Defense Spending	1.3%	3%	3.1%

as part of GDP

*The figures in parentheses indicate the size of the force as a percentage of the total population.

armored and air forces because there is lower maintenance and operating cost.

But comparing the forces in this manner does not address the full military picture. There are differences in terrain between these countries that make fighting in one different from fighting in another, and defensive schemes that West Germany probably would not adopt.

In order to maintain its neutrality, Austria cannot enter into any alliances to help protect itself. Since the country shares a border with Warsaw Pact forces, and is between NATO forces in Italy and West Germany, it feels that its greatest threat of attack is from one or both of these forces trying to use Austria as a route of attack against the other. The forces are therefore designed to delay and harass any such efforts. The plans are for the army to fight in a delayed withdrawal type action until the Alps are reached, and then harass the enemy with guerrilla warfare. The infantry forces that Austria maintains are ideally suited to this type of action. The government hopes that the threat of this type of warfare would be so costly to any attacking force because of the delay it will cause, that it will deter any possible aggression.

Sweden has divided her defense effort into two sectors, one in the north and one in south. The possibility of attack in the north is not very great due

to the rugged terrain and lack of maneuver space for armored vehicles. Because of the numerous lakes and the marshy ground, an attacking force would be confined to predominantly road movements, allowing the Swedish forces the advantage of defending from prepared positions along the roadway. Attack from the south would be by sea, and would also be met by strong resistance from point defenses. The government expects to prevent an attack from reaching the main sectors of the country by defeating it before it lands on the beaches or gets past the northern defenses. If this fails, however, the military is ready to fight delaying type actions that trade space for time until the attack is defeated (4).

West Germany does not have the advantage of terrain that either Austria or Sweden has. There are numerous sectors along the border that can support large scale armored invasions, and would require the West German government to field a force at least as large as the current NATO forces in order to serve as an effective deterrent. Erecting barriers and fortifications such as the Swedes and Austrians have done is unpalatable to the West German government, because it would cause, in effect, a recognition of the East German border as a legitimate border. This is something the West German government does not want to do because of the reunification goal (5). In addition, any strategy that trades space for time is as

unacceptable now as it was when this strategy was first planned in NATO (6).

The final consideration against West Germany providing for its own defense is the large amounts of nuclear weapons controlled by the Soviet Army in East Germany. A panel discussion was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Goetz Sperling of the Bundeswehr to examine the issue of whether or not there was a better alternative for West Germany's defense. The panel members were experts in political and military matters, and were nominated for participation on the panel by the various parties in the Bundestag. There was, quite naturally, a wide difference of opinion because of the broad political spectrum represented; however, the consensus of the panel was that any restructuring of West German forces would not be feasible because the country could not raise and equip an armed force large enough to act as an effective deterrent against Warsaw Pact forces. The flexible response strategy is, at the present, the only effective defense for West Germany. Nuclear weapons guarantee that any type of attack will eventually become too costly for the enemy. Since West Germany is not allowed to produce these weapons, it must remain a member of NATO in order to maintain an adequate and cost effective defense (7).

THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF NATO

The stationing of foreign forces in West Germany provides an economic benefit for the communities near military installations. These installations purchase services and employ workers to perform various administrative and support functions that help run the base operations. The United States government has paid an average of six billion dollars a year for this (8). Foreign soldiers also pay money into the economy, although there is no good indicator of what this amounts to in dollars. Soldiers and their family members rent housing, shop in local stores and spend money on recreation available in the area. A recent report concerning the closing of an American air base in Spain might serve as a good indicator of the impact that an American base has on the local economy. A recent decision to close the Torrejon Air Force Base will result in the loss of 1200 jobs performed by Spaniards on the base, and millions of dollars in lost revenue from the base and its military personnel (9). I believe that it is a valid assumption that American and other foreign army bases have the same impact on the local communities in West Germany (10).

THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF NATO

Just as West Germany became a member of the NATO alliance in 1954, East Germany became a member of the

Warsaw Pact alliance in 1955. Since 1955, these two states have faced each other as potential enemies. Under West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, these relations began to change as he pursued his policy of Ostpolitik.

The result of this policy is that relations between East and West Germany have improved, and economic and cultural exchanges have increased. West Germany provides low cost loans to the East Germans and provides industrial and scientific experts to help establish programs in East Germany. It also allows East Germany special credits so that it does not have to pay hard currency for West German goods, greatly easing its financial burden since the availability of western currency is limited in the Communist Bloc.

Bonn does not want to recognize its border with East Germany as a frontier because it would mean a recognition that the two Germanies were separate nations which would nullify the hopes for reunification. As a result of the improved relations between the two Germanies, West Germany was able to persuade other members of the Common Market to agree to a protocol that recognized East German goods as being the same as West German. This means that East Germany does not have to pay the import tariffs that other countries who are not Common Market members must pay when importing goods (11). In return, West Germany has received concessions on important humanitarian issues, and

has kept alive the hope of reunification. As a result of this policy, more people have been allowed to emigrate from East Germany, and visits, both East and West have increased.

Many West Germany's NATO allies view the pursuit of Ostpolitik with alarm. The feeling is that the trade and economic relations that exist bolster the East German and ultimately the Soviet economy, which allows them to pursue their military efforts more freely. Some of the advantages that are gained by this type of relationship is that western technology can be put to use in the military sphere and thus enhance the military power of the Warsaw Pact forces. Other advantages come from Western currency that becomes available through trade or loans. This currency strengthens what would otherwise be an economically weak communist regime, and thus helps support the same governments against whom NATO is trying to defend. The overall effect of this policy, as the argument goes, is that strengthening the East in this manner reduces the effectiveness of NATO's military strength (12).

If these concerns were to be considered from the view point that NATO is simply a military alliance, they would make sense. However, what is not considered by arguments such as these is the extent to which Ostpolitik adds to the social and political support of West Germany's

participation in the alliance, and the effects of stronger diplomatic and economic ties between East and West Germany.

Whether or not reunification of the two Germanies is a political reality, the idea has strong support among the population. Ostpolitik is seen as a way to work towards that goal by allowing an easing of the tensions between the two states by maintaining social, political and economic contact. More importantly, it gives the government the ability to balance the two goals of security and reunification so that a choice does not have to be made between the two. If West Germany had to provide for its own defense without the benefit of the alliance, it is possible that a West German Army facing an East German Army would cause tensions that could not be overcome by Ostpolitik, thereby taking away the chance of reunification.

Improved relations between the two Germanies enable them to maintain a relationship regardless of the relationship between the two superpowers. Even with the increased tensions between the superpowers in the late 70's and early 80's, East Germany was able to resist pressure from Moscow and went ahead with the building of a VW plant in East Germany. This does not mean, however, that East Germany has a free reign over its foreign policy, for when it comes to basic issues of Warsaw Pact solidarity, East Germany must still take orders from

Moscow. The most obvious example occurred during the planning of East German Chancellor Honnecker's visit to West Germany in 1984. This would have been the first visit by an East German Chancellor to West Germany, but the visit was cancelled because of pressures from Moscow when Bonn agreed to the stationing of American missiles in West Germany (13). This did not, however, cause a rift in the relationship between the two Germanies.

There is another possible benefit that could have come as a result of Ostpolitik. Although there is not conclusive evidence to support this assumption, there are reports that the Soviet Union does not completely trust the East German forces, and therefore takes some extraordinary measures to ensure that they will perform missions assigned them. One such measure reported is the assignment of Soviet officers or noncommissioned officers in greater numbers to East German armies than to other Pact armies. And there is also evidence to suggest that East German soldiers would not be reliable in offensive actions taken against West Germany (14). The validity of such reports is hard to judge, but there is a possible correlation between East and West German relations, and the willingness of East German soldiers to undertake offensive actions against West Germans.

CONCLUSION

Given the present set of circumstances in Europe, where a large Warsaw Pact army is stationed directly across the border from West Germany, it seems that the NATO alliance provides West Germany with the best means to protect itself. Two countries that are in a comparable position to West Germany in Europe, but that are not a part of the NATO alliance, dedicate more manpower to their defense effort than does West Germany, and spend in one case almost as much and in another case less on their defenses. In the final analysis, however, they are willing to sacrifice terrain to gain time, where West Germany is not.

The West German public receives money from foreign forces for goods and services, and is able to employ members of the community in local military installations. The help this provides local economies is a benefit not often considered when discussing NATO, but one that would be missed if these forces were to leave the area.

In the political area, West Germany has been able to pursue its goal of reunification, and still maintain an effective deterrent against attack. Ostpolitik enables the two Germanies to maintain contact with each other, even when Superpower tensions are high. Ostpolitik gives East Germany an important economic tie with the west that removes it, to a degree, from the Soviet sphere of influence. While some may argue that this economic tie

strengthens the Soviet Bloc, it may also be argued that this loss of influence may cause the Soviet Union to doubt the loyalty of one of its major allies, thereby reducing the possibility of the Soviets launching an attack towards the west.

These benefits come as a result of West Germany's alliance in NATO, and show that West Germany also receives something in return besides a strong defense.

ENDNOTES

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5. George C. Wilson, "Senator Pushes W. Germany To Erect Antitank Lines," The Washington Post July 25, 1986, sec. A:23.
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CHAPTER 7

THE FUTURE OF WEST GERMANY IN NATO

Since the time that NATO came into existence, the mission of providing a solid Western European and American deterrent against attack has never changed. This is not true of the military and political structures, for they have changed throughout the years to meet the changing threat, and to accommodate the changes in relationships between the various members of the alliance. West Germany is one of the members whose relationship with the other members of NATO has changed the most. West Germany's economic strength and strategic position in Central Europe make it an important member of the alliance. There are economic, political and military forces at work today that seem to indicate that the structure of the alliance is changing. Based on the changes that have taken place in West Germany since 1955, it seems that its role in NATO will also change in the future.

At the present there are two trends, one stronger than the other, that seem to point the direction which West Germany will take. One course is a greater military and political role more in line with its contribution to the alliance. The other course is a tendency to opt for neutralism that would take West Germany out of the NATO

sphere of influence (1). The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the factors affecting change in the alliance, and the forces behind the two separate courses of action West Germany may take as a result.

THE CAUSES OF CHANGE

Many in Europe question the future of America in the NATO alliance. America became a world power after the Second World War because of her economic and military strength. America was willing to project this power whenever it was necessary to help its allies. It used this power in the rebuilding process of Europe and in establishing NATO, and has provided a guarantee of nuclear retaliation in the event that NATO's conventional forces failed. There is a rising fear that the United States no longer feels as strongly committed to this nuclear retaliation because of the destruction it would bring to the United States. If this is so, then the Western Europeans feel that the Flexible Response strategy is of little value, for the lack of commitment to nuclear weapon use would cause a war to be fought only by conventional forces, in the type of battle where the Soviets may be willing to face heavy losses due to what they could gain if successful.

The coupling of America's nuclear weapons to the NATO defenses is the key to the success of Flexible Response.

It guarantees that any action undertaken would be too costly to the attacker. But in this age of nuclear parity, it also guarantees that America will be attacked with nuclear weapons. America has maintained an attitude, recently reiterated by President Reagan, that "if the bomb is dropped in Amsterdam, it is the equivalent of dropping a bomb on Chicago" (2). But the Western Europeans cannot help but wonder how strong America's commitment to this idea is.

In 1982, an article written by McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith appeared in the journal Foreign Affairs, which outlined the authors opinion of the dangers of the United States' nuclear commitment to Europe. The article pointed out that the dangerously low number of conventional forces meant that a war in Europe would require the use of nuclear weapons early on, and that such use would most assuredly cause the Soviets to retaliate against the United States with their nuclear forces. To decrease this danger, these four influential men recommended that the United States adopt a policy of No First Use. The authors then went on to write that the result of this policy would be that the NATO conventional forces would need to be strengthened to increase the credibility of deterrence, something that should be the responsibility of the Western Europeans (3).

Four prominent West Germans, Karl Kaiser, Georg

Leber, Alois Mertes and Franz-Josef Schulze, responded to this article by saying that a declaration of this nature would undermine the very existence of NATO. They said that it is the threat of a nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union that has maintained peace in Europe, for the Soviets consider nuclear retaliation to be too costly for any success they may get from a conventional attack (4). They further pointed out that the NATO alliance was one of equals, and that all share the benefits of equal security and equal risk. The fact that the United States was facing the same threat of destruction that West Germany had faced for so long, served to strengthen the alliance by creating a "credibility of deterrence"(5). They felt that the United States should not adopt the No First Use policy because it would undermine the whole strategy of Flexible Response.

There were further signs that the United States was contemplating a role that would change its participation within NATO. Actions and statements made by influential people both inside and outside the government raised many questions concerning what America's commitment would be in the future.

President Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983, a system which, when complete, would protect the United States from a Soviet

missile attack. According to the President, once the system was fully operational, there would be no need for strategic nuclear weapons, because America would be safe from attack and there would be no need to undertake retaliatory strikes (6). The benefit of this defense would not be extended to Western Europe. This meant that Western Europe would still be vulnerable to a Soviet attack without the benefit of America's nuclear protection (7). It is still debatable whether or not a system such as this can become operational in the near future, or at all, but the fact that the United States would contemplate such a defense against a Soviet attack and leave Western Europe vulnerable seemed to signal that America would withdraw from its commitment to Europe (8).

Two men who had been strong supporters of Western Europe contributed to the concern among America's allies. In 1984, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in Time that a restructuring of NATO was needed so that Europe would do more for its own defense (9). His plan would place greater responsibility upon the Europeans by requiring them to provide the leadership and majority of conventional forces. That same year, Senator Sam Nunn proposed that American forces be withdrawn from Europe if the Europeans did not do more for their own defense. This would have been dismissed as just another burden sharing complaint, except that Senator Nunn was known for his

strong commitment to NATO. Eleven years earlier he had been instrumental in causing the defeat of a similar proposal by Senator Mike Mansfield (10). The fact that two staunch supporters of NATO proposed a reduction of the American presence caused the Europeans to reassess the future of America's involvement in NATO.

Probably one of the most disconcerting events occurred in late 1985 when President Reagan met with Soviet Premier Gorbachev. The purpose of the meeting was to set an agenda for a future summit between the two leaders, but resulted in both men agreeing to investigate the possibility of reducing the number of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe. There was great concern over this because the United States had acted unilaterally in pursuing a policy that affected all of NATO. Western Europe, and West Germany in particular, had been the scene of massive demonstrations over the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles. The various NATO governments supported the United States in this deployment, often to their political disadvantage. To be surprised over a major policy such as this caused them to wonder about America's intentions (11).

Underlying this concern about the American actions is the growing realization that America is no longer in the position of being able to support such a large military commitment while continuing to pursue its domestic goals.

A large trade deficit and an ever increasing budget deficit has been causing the United States to reevaluate its commitments as a superpower in order to ease its financial burden.

Whether or not America will reduce its European commitment remains to be seen. The history of NATO shows that it has weathered many crises which seemed at the time to be threatening its existence. If NATO were simply a military or a political alliance, perhaps it would have dissolved. But it did not cease to exist because it is a flexible organization that can adapt to meet the present day needs. Recent trends can be seen occurring in Western Europe that suggest the European part of the partnership is changing by increasing cooperation amongst themselves for their defense effort. It could be that this is being done to calm the critics who want to see Europe take on a greater share of the burden, or it could be that they are preparing to fill the gap in the defense once America leaves. As these changes take place, the question arises as to what role West Germany will play in the alliance.

WEST GERMANY'S CHANGING ROLE IN WESTERN EUROPE

It seems only natural that West Germany should play an increasingly important role in NATO. West Germany has a strong economy, a large industrial base and one of the largest populations in Western Europe. It also occupies

the key military terrain upon which a future battle is likely to be fought, and supplies the largest number of ground forces, both active and reserve, which would be available for immediate use when needed. What has prevented West Germany from taking a leading role up to now is the stigma attached to the country's history. All of the Western European NATO members except Spain were involved with the fighting in the Second World War, and with the exception of Great Britain, suffered under German occupation. But new generations are coming of age in Europe and new leaders are taking charge in government for whom the war is a part of history and not one of personal experience. As a result, this stigma is starting to give way to present day realities that recognize West Germany's importance.

One example is the increased leadership role that West Germany is assuming in NATO. The command structure that evolved in 1954 was designed so that a West German would never be in a position to have command over a large German force. Although this restriction remains in place, the appointment of West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner as the next Secretary General of NATO is a sign of the increasing respect the Germans have attained.

The Secretary General is not considered part of the military command structure of NATO. Instead, his duties are to lead the North Atlantic Council, which is the

highest level of political decision making within the alliance. Members that sit on the Council are appointed to act as their government's representatives to coordinate the political decisions that affect NATO. In addition to the job of serving as this body's leader, the Secretary General oversees the functioning of various committees, and heads the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group (12). This is the first time that a West German has been selected to serve in such an important leadership position within the NATO structure.

West Germany also has an important role outside of the NATO structure. It participates as a member of the European Common Market, serves as a banking leader in Western Europe and takes part in other types of business, cultural and political activities that show that relations among the nations in Western Europe are normal with West Germany. But probably the most telling example of this is the growing cooperation in defense matters between France and West Germany.

The Germans and French have been traditional enemies for many centuries. After the war the French were particularly anxious to ensure that Germany would never again be in a position militarily to undertake an attack. The fear of a rearmed Germany was so great after the war that before NATO came into being, France entered into the Treaty of Brussels with Great Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg

and the Netherlands with the specific intent to prevent Germany from becoming a military threat in the area (13). In 1963 the Elysee Treaty was signed by Charles DeGaulle and Konrad Adenauer pledging their country's mutual friendship. Although relations between the two countries started to improve, cooperation in the military sphere has been virtually nonexistent since France left the NATO command structure in the late 60's.

As recently as 1984, French President Francois Mitterand rejected a bid to extend the French nuclear deterrent to West Germany by saying that France "will be using its nuclear task force strictly for the purposes of its own security" (14). This view caused the French to reject any cooperative effort with West Germany because it would link the defense policies of the two countries too closely together.

Questions about America's intentions in maintaining its NATO commitment have caused the French to reconsider this policy and to seek closer ties with its West German neighbor. In 1987 French Prime Minister Chirac pledged that if West Germany were attacked, France's response would be "immediate and without reservation" (15). President Mitterand, the overall commander of the French forces, stated that he was in agreement with the Prime Minister's statement, and emphasized France's desire to strengthen military cooperation with West Germany (16).

That such a consensus could be reached concerning France's military commitment between a Gaullist Prime Minister and a Socialist President shows the support this idea has in French politics.

The result of this commitment is that both France and West Germany have begun to work on cooperative defense efforts. France recently committed a 20,000 man unit known as Force d'Action Rapide, or Rapid Deployment Force, which is set up to respond to aid West Germany if attacked (17). This unit engaged in large scale maneuvers with West German forces in Bavaria during the fall of 1987. Although this is not a significant force in size, it does signal France's determination to assist West Germany in defending itself, something that was not previously done.

Another cooperative effort being undertaken is a joint brigade between the French and Germans which will be stationed in West Germany and is due to be activated by late 1988. A joint military council was set up in January 1988 to begin planning the operations of the brigade, and both countries will begin to assign men and equipment to the brigade to serve as a mutual defense force. Command of the unit will alternate between French and West German officers. The military significance of this unit is not great, since West Germany will not assign first line soldiers to this unit since they are already committed to the NATO structure (18). But politically this brigade

emphasizes the cooperation and trust that has developed between the two countries and adds another dimension to the defense of Western Europe.

Chancellor Kohl characterizes this cooperation as an "alliance within an alliance" because this joint defense effort does not change the status of either nation in NATO. France still remains outside the NATO command structure while West Germany retains its place within it.

All these signs seem to indicate that West Germany is becoming an important force in the NATO alliance, and will have an ever increasing role in its leadership.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEUTRAL WEST GERMANY

Up to this point the discussion has focused upon some of the factors causing change within the alliance, and how West Germany is taking on an increasingly important role. These factors have been considered under present day conditions, where the stationing of a large contingent of American forces in West Germany assures the Europeans of America's commitment. Given another set of circumstances, where American forces are no longer present, it is entirely possible that West Germany would reject commitment to any type of Western military alliance and rather choose the option of becoming a neutral state.

At the present time neutralism is not an attractive option for the majority of the public because of the large

number of military forces in the Warsaw Pact, and the common ties between West Germany with the other members of NATO through the Common Market or trade with the United States (19). In addition, the restrictions that prevent West Germany from being able to possess nuclear weapons prevents the country from having an effective deterrent against a large scale invasion. This causes the country to rely upon the nuclear arsenal of America. The United States also shows its commitment to NATO with its forces, and thereby gives the West Germans confidence in the alliance (20). This confidence makes the status quo more attractive than other options because it has been successful up to this point in preventing war. Finally, the United States provides the overall leadership to the alliance which provides a common direction for the many different Western European nations to follow (21).

If the United States were to pull out of the alliance, it is quite possible that NATO would cease being an effective force because there would be no one country that could step in and provide the common leadership and guarantees that the United States currently provides. The only two countries that could provide a nuclear deterrent are France and Great Britain, and neither has a large enough conventional force that can be stationed in such a manner as to be a credible deterrent against the Soviet Union. The largest number of ground forces in NATO is

provided by West Germany, and would therefore make the logical choice to take over the leadership task. In order to do this the restrictions that have been placed on West Germany that prevent this leadership would have to be changed, and some sort of agreement would have to be reached on the command and control of nuclear weapons so that the military commander would have some control over their use, an idea to which the French and British would probably not agree. The result would probably be that the many different nations would seek their own alliances and accommodations within Europe.

It is at this point that neutralism might become a popular option in West Germany. America's involvement in the alliance is predicated upon the assumption that it is needed to counter the Soviet threat. Devolution would send a signal that America no longer considered the threat to be significant and that NATO is no longer needed to deter aggression. The result could be that the West Germans would reject the stationing of any foreign forces on its soil due to the lack of need.

There are political parties or factions on both the left and right in West Germany whose policies coincide on the issue of neutralism. The Greens Party and certain members of the SPD on the left and nationalists on the right despise the occupation of foreign forces in West Germany. They feel that West Germany's policies are

linked too closely with those of the United States and that their future survival is tied to relations between the superpowers over which they have no control (22). Both criticize the present government for its policies and close support of President Reagan.

To understand how strong this sentiment is, one need only look at the massive protests that occurred over the government's decision to station American missiles in West Germany. Chancellor Kohl staked both his party's and his own political future on going ahead with this deployment, and was successful. The subsequent problems that occurred because of the Reykjavik summit that led to the removal of these same missiles caused problems on the right. It appeared that the Chancellor's call to eliminate all nuclear weapons was a sell-out to the various pressure groups and did not leave an adequate deterrent against the Warsaw Pact (23).

It is quite possible that the current government would lose its support if America went ahead with decoupling, because of the strong support the current government has given America in its policies would have proved to be an error. This would give other parties an opportunity to try and gain popular support for their policies, at which time neutrality could be a popular option, more so than joining in some other type of alliance in Western Europe.

The fear of America's devolution is the catalyst behind the present day cooperation between France and West Germany. But the question is whether the West Germans would accept foreign soldiers stationed in their country once the American forces had left, and if they would want to trade America's nuclear guarantee and its threat of destruction for that of France, whose nuclear weapons are predominantly short range and thus would cause greater damage to West Germany than America's strategic forces. President Mitterand addressed this fear by promising to consult with West Germany, if at all possible, prior to using nuclear weapons (24). But this is probably not a very comforting thought for the Germans who until recent times have lived with a French neighbor that claimed its nuclear and conventional forces were to be used to protect France. Whether or not the West Germans would accept such an alliance is debatable, because neutrality would probably appear to be a better option.

Neutrality would also make it possible for West Germany to seek reunification with East Germany, a goal that is a constant theme in West German politics. Once the country was neutral it could start seeking the necessary arrangements to achieve this goal. There is a precedent for this. In 1955 the Soviets offered the possibility of reunification if Adenauer did not go ahead and join NATO. Adenauer rejected this offer fearing that

the Soviets would try to subjugate the West Germans to their rule at some future date; something West Germany could not prevent without the help of the West (25).

The Soviets would be the key to any type of reunification, for they would have to weigh the benefits of allowing one of the richest and most productive satellite states from leaving their sphere of influence. It would also set a precedent that could cause problems in other East Bloc countries who may not be seeking reunification, but instead greater freedom from the Soviets. The benefit of luring West Germany away from the West by allowing reunification would be an advantage that may offset the loss of East Germany, for this would upset the balance of power that presently exists. In either case, a neutral West Germany would have to be in place before the Soviets would even consider reunification.

Other questions are raised over the prospect of a neutral Germany. The first is what the status of West Berlin would be. West Berlin is still considered an occupied city, the only such remnant of post-war conditions. The city is a symbol of the West's resolve to support democracy and freedom, having weathered the crises of the blockade in 1949 and the building of the wall in 1961 which prompted the visit of President Kennedy and his famous declaration "Ich bin ein Berliner!" Would the pulling out of forces in West Berlin be seen as a lack of

commitment on the part of the West and cause an attempt by the Soviets or East Germans to take it over?

Another question is what the reaction of France and Great Britain would be. Their fear of Germany stems from historical facts, and they would probably wonder if a neutral West Germany, or a united Germany, was any different from Weimar Germany. This is not to suggest that there is a correlation between the Weimar government and the present government. Rather the correlation is an independent Germany that today has one of the largest economies, populations and military forces in Western Europe and could cause problems if militancy were to revive. This may not be a rational fear given the present day circumstances, but it would surely be a thought if West Germany decided to become neutral.

CONCLUSION

The role that West Germany plays in NATO in the future will depend to a large degree on the course of action chosen by the United States. Under the present set of circumstances, it is obvious that West Germany will continue to play an increasingly important role commensurate with its economic and military strength. A drastic change in the structure, such as a withdrawal of American forces, could well cause the dissolution of the alliance and a restructuring of security commitments. If

this were to happen, I believe the most likely course that West Germany would choose is some form of neutrality.

ENDNOTES

1. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger, The Public and Atlantic Defense (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985) 127. In a public opinion poll, 78% of the West Germans questioned felt that neutralism was not an attractive option while only 5% felt that it was.
2. Julie Johnson, "Unity Stressed at NATO Summit but Tough Issues are Unresolved," The New York Times March 4, 1988, sec A: 6.
3. McGeorge Bundy, et al., "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs 60 (1982): 753-768.
4. Karl Kaiser, et al., "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A Response to an American Proposal for Renouncing the First Use of Nuclear Weapons," Foreign Affairs 60 (1982): 1158-1161. These men held the following credentials at the time of the article: Karl Kaiser was Director of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn, Georg Leber was Vice President of the Bundestag and former Defense Minister, Alois Mertes was a member of the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee, and Franz-Josef Schulze retired from the Bundeswehr as a General and served as Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Central Europe and Deputy Chief of Staff, Allied Command Europe.
5. Karl Kaiser, et al., Foreign Affairs, 1161.
6. "President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense," The New York Times March 24, 1983: 20.
7. It should be noted that the offer was extended to share the technology of this system with Western Europe, but the short amount of time it would take a missile to fly from Eastern Europe would not allow enough reaction time, and therefore makes the system ineffectual.
8. Robert C. Richardson, "SDI and Peace in Europe," The Dissolving Alliance: The United States and the Future of Europe, ed. Richard L Rubenstein (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987) 156-158; Steven J. Cimbala, Extended Deterrence: The United States and NATO Europe (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1987) 9-14; Kurt Kaiser, "Questions over missiles defense plan," The German Tribune February 25, 1985: 1.
9. Henry Kissinger, "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time March 5, 1984: 20-24. For the West German reaction to this article, see: Heinz Barsch, "Schuss vor dem Bug," Die Welt February 28, 1984: 4; "Eine sehr gefaerliche

Situation," Der Spiegel March 3, 1984: 134-137. Both of these articles warn that Kissinger's article is not an empty threat but rather reflects a growing mood in America that the Europeans must recognize and plan for.

10. Phil Williams, The Senate and US Troops in Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985) 219-220. For the West German reaction to the Nunn Amendment, see: Ulrich Schiller, "Schocktherapie fuer die Europaeische Nordatlantisches Bundniss: Die amerikanisches Kongress erwartet groessere finanzielle Leistungen von den Verbundeten," Die Zeit June 6, 1984: 7; and Moniac Rudiger, "Woerner muss Remedur schaffen, und er muss Klartext reden," Die Welt July 7, 1984: 2.

11. Walter Goldstein ed., Clash in the North: Polar Summitry and NATO's Northern Flank (McLean: Pergamon - Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988) 3-12.

12. NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1978) 205-210.

13. Article 7 of the Treaty requires the members to "consult together as to the attitude and the measure to take in the event of the resumption of an aggressive policy on the part of Germany."

14. Kurt Becker, "Europe blueprints its own security policy," The German Tribune March 4, 1988: 1.

15. James M. Markham, "Germans' Defense pledged By Paris," The New York Times December 21, 1987, sec. A: 11.

16. William Echikson, "France Shifts Nuclear Stance," The Christian Science Monitor December 21, 1987: 9.

17. Philip Revzin, "French Fight to Anchor Germany in West," The Wall Street Journal January 21, 1988: 26.

18. Elizabeth Pond, "French - German ventures raise eyebrows - as well as suspicion - in Europe," The Christian Science Monitor January 25, 1988: 8; and Klaus Huwe, "Paris looks for changes to Euro defence strategy," The German Tribune October 18, 1987: 1.

19. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger, The Public and Atlantic Defense, 144. In answer to the question Do you think NATO is necessary? 83% responded yes, 7% responded no, and 10% expressed no opinion.

20. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger, The Public and Atlantic Defense, 144. 72% of the people questioned felt

that the United States would come to Germany's aid if attacked, while 12% felt that America would not help. 16% of those polled had no opinion.

21. For a discussion of the stabilizing effect that American forces have on NATO, see: Colonel J. Alford, "The Strategic Realities of the Atlantic Alliance: A European View," The Future of European Defence, ed. Frans Bletz and Rio Praaning (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986) 27-31; and Walter Goldstein, ed., Clash in the North: Polar Summitry and NATO's Northern Flank (McLean: Pergamon - Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988) 9-10.

22. Guenter Gaus, "A Peace Policy for Germany," Germany Debates Defense: The: The NATO Alliance at the Crossroads, ed. Rudolf Steincke and Michael Vale (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1983) 97-116; Reimund Seidelmann, "German Defense Policy," Defense Politics of the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Edwin H. Fedder (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) 72-79; George K. Romoser and H.G. Peter Wallach ed., West German Politics in the Mid-Eighties (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985) 260; Josef Joffe, "German Anti-Americanism on the Right," The Wall Street Journal February 10, 1988: 21; and "The Next German Question," The Economist January 23, 1988: 11-12.

23. Elizabeth Pond, "Kohl's arms offer a real surprise," The Christian Science Monitor May 18, 1987: 9.

24. William Echikson, "France Shifts Nuclear Stance," The Christian Science Monitor December 21, 1987: 9.

25. Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., The Two Germanies since 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) 75-76.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Something which every business minded American knows is that in a capitalist society everything has a price. America has in recent times committed seven per cent of its GDP to defend its interests around the globe. The portion which has been spent on America's NATO commitment, which has cost a little more than half of the total defense outlay, has been money well spent in maintaining an unprecedented period of peace in Western Europe. If America's goal in insisting on an equitable amount of burden sharing is that all allies pay an equal portion of their GDP to NATO's defenses, then West Germany is sharing an equal part of the burden with America.

This study has taken the burden sharing argument one step further and has looked at some items that West Germany contributes to the alliance which Americans never even think of when they think of defense. These items show that overall West Germany does more for the defense of Western Europe than America, and should therefore cause some humility among those who champion the burden sharing argument. Humility has never been one of America's virtues.

The alliance has weathered many crises in the past,

burden sharing included, and has maintained its original intent and suffered some slight changes in structure. The role that West Germany will play in the future depends to a large extent on how this latest crisis is solved. Recent trends show that if America's commitment remains as it is, West Germany will probably play an increasingly important role in both the political and military spheres. A devolution of American forces could have an effect quite the opposite of that desired by America.

West Germany is a world power in all aspects except one: its military power. West Germany is probably one of the most militarized democracies in the world, with one of the largest armies in Western Europe in addition to the seven foreign armies stationed on its soil. Post-war realities gave West Germany little choice in having to accept this. If America were to reduce its presence, West Germany would have cause to reevaluate its position in regards to the conditions it has been forced to accept, causing a change in the present order. This is just one more item that should be considered when talking about solving the burden sharing problem.

If America still considers its presence necessary in Europe in order to protect its interests, there are more salient issues than West Germany's share of the burden which need to be addressed.

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